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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 41

Under CPLR 4102(a), a demand for a jury trial must be
contained in the note of issue or in a written demand served upon
the parties within ten days after service of the note of issue.13 6
If a special verdict is required, the trial judge, under CPLR 4111,
frames the issue for the jury's verdict. "No longer are motions
for framing issues to be made," 137 said the court, except under
CPLR 4212, regarding the advisory jury.
ARTICLE
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TRIAL MOTIONS

CPLR 4402: Inadvertent reference to insurance in action involving
autonwbile registered in New York not sufficient ground
upon which to declare a mistrial.
Upon the trial of the action in Halsteadv. Sanky, 138 a passenger
in plaintiff's auto revealed, upon cross examination, that he had
given a statement to someone concerning the accident and that he
received $2000.00 in settlement of his own claim. On re-direct, he
was asked whether the person with whom he had settled was a
representative of the defendant. The witness answered, "'he was
from the insurance company.' "189 The defendant's motion for a
mistrial was denied after a poll of the jury revealed that the
reference to insurance did not affect the jurors' determination of
the case.140
The court refused to declare a mistrial based merely upon the
single inadvertent reference to insurance, especially since the auto
was registered in New York. The court stated that New York
has a compulsory insurance law1 1 and the jurors were questioned,
on voir dire, concerning their relationship to insurance companies;142
therefore, to attribute to the jury ignorance of the existence of
insurance in this case would be tantamount to a condemnation of
the jury system.
The CPLR revisors have commented that in light of compulsory
insurance, the matter of insurance will be of limited importance in
136 Such a demand must specify the issues to be determined by the jury
unless a general demand for a jury trial is made. See 4 WwzusTn, KoRN &

NEw Yop- Civm PRAcncE 14102.08 (1965).
137 Brown v. Brown, 47 Misc. 2d 1046, 263 N.Y.S2d 717, 718 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1965).
138 48 Misc. 2d 586, 265 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct Kings County 1965).
-9 Id. at 587, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 427.
MILLER,

140 This court polled the jury under the procedure sanctioned by the Court
of Appeals in Weisgerber v. Ancona, 284 N.Y. 665, 30 N.E.d 608 (1940).
141 N.Y. VEmIcLm & TRmFlc LAW § 312(1). This section makes proof of

insurance coverage a condition precedent to registering a motor vehicle.

142 CPLR 4110 allows a prospective juror to be asked whether he is a
"shareholder, stockholder, director, officer or employee or in any manner
interested, in any insurance company issuing policies for protection against
liability for damages for injury to persons or property... "'
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the future ;143 and in Uy v. Shapmor, Inc.,'" the appellate term
stated: "were this an automobile accident case.. . [the inadvertent
mention of insurance would not have been a ground for declaring a
mistrial] because it is generally known by the public today that
New York State145 has provided for compulsory liability insurance
of automobiles.'
While the deliberate disclosure of the presence of a liability
insurer is still a ground for declaring a mistrial, the Halstead
decision has effectuated the liberal policy of the CPLR by ignoring
inadvertent, non-prejudicial disclosure.
ARTICLE

52-ENFORCEMENT

OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5201: Future income of a spendthrift trust held attachable.
In Cohen v. Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 46 the court held
that an attachment of the income of a spendthrift trust was effective,
to the extent of ten per cent, against both the accrued income and
future income of the trust. The Loeb company, defendant in the
case, had impleaded one Dolan based upon his contract of indemnity.
As third-party plaintiff, the Loeb company obtained an order
attaching Dolan's interest in a certain testamentary trust, the corpus
of which was located in New York. In holding the attachment
valid, the court cited Koch v. Burdsal 4 7 as authority for the
proposition that the attachment was
148 effective against ten per cent
of the future income of the trust.
CPLR 6202 makes subject to attachment "any debt or property
against which a money judgment may be enforced as provided in
section 5201," which in turn essentially provides for execution
against any property which could be assigned or transferred.149
The apparent purpose of CPLR 6202 is to equate property subject
to execution with property subject to attachment and thereby to
eliminate the discrepancies which resulted from separate listings
143

SECOND

RE,. 233. See also 4 WEiNsTmN, Kour & MmiLER,

Nsw YoRa

Civn PRAcrxcF 14110.05 (1965).

144 45 Misc. 2d 543, 257 N.Y.S.2d 208 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1965).

1- Id. at 544, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 209; Hager v. Bushman, 255 App. Div. 934,
8 N.Y.S.2d 725 (4th Dep't 1938); cf. Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d
111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965).
14048 Misc. 2d 159, 162, 264 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1965).
147 199 Misc. 880, 104 N.Y.S.2d 782 (N.Y. City Ct 1951).

143 Cohen v. Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 48 Misc. 2d 159, 162, 264
N.Y.S2d 463, 466 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965). See also note 158 infra for
a discussion of Koch.
149 See CPLR 5201(b). As to debts, as opposed to property, CPLR 5201(a)

permits enforcement of a money judgment against "any debt, which is past
due or which is yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment
debtor. ..

'

